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Growth is a primary concern to shareholders since it opens the path to higher profits and 
boosts firm value (Cowling, 2004; Coad, 2007; Coad, 2010). As a matter of fact, McConnell 
and Muscarella (1985) find evidence that announcements of increases in capital expenditures 
are associated with significant increases in share prices. But how can firms achieve higher 
growth rates? Economic principles suggest that growth can be sustained through innovation 
and operating efficiency.  
Innovation promotes firm growth by accelerating the development of new products. It also 
helps firms to identify new applications for their existing products. Grossman and Helpman 
(1994) argue that investments in knowledge play a critical role in the long-run growth 
process. A large body of evidence demonstrates the link between innovation and firm growth. 
García-Manjóna and Romero-Merino (2012) emphasize that the effect of R&D on sales 
growth is especially critical in high-technology industries. Furthermore, Audretsch (1995) 
points out that innovation is a critical determinant of firm survival in industries where 
innovative activity is significant.  
Operating efficiency is another critical contributor to long-term firm growth. By producing 
more efficiently, firms can take market share away from their competitors. Besides, investors 
can hold back the growth of less efficient firms by restricting their access to capital. They can 
also encourage efficient firms to take over the productive assets of their less efficient rivals. In 
this regard, Maksimovic and Phillips (2001) show that industry-level productivity increases 
mainly through the transfer of assets from less efficient to more efficient producers.  
In this paper, we examine the heretofore-unexplored question of whether firm growth is 
related to CEO tenure. The literature suggests both a positive and a negative relationship. On 
the one hand, long-tenured CEOs are expected to have a deeper understanding of the firm’s 
resources and links to its environment. This should help the firm to achieve greater operating 
efficiency and therefore to grow faster. On the other hand, Miller (1991) explains that longer-
tenured CEOs become complacent and tend to cling to outdated paradigms. As a result, they 
become less open to change and less prepared to innovate and sustain the growth of their 
firms. On balance, it would seem that these two effects balance each other.   
However, the firm’s context also needs to be taken into account. In rapidly-growing firms, 
efficiency is less of a priority than the ability to innovate and come up with new products. In 
that sense, short-tenured CEOs would seem to bring greater benefits due to their greater 
openness to new ideas. In slow-growing firms, by contrast, efficiency is critical to the firm’s 
success. Since growth is more likely to come at the expense of competitors, having a long-
tenured CEO with a thorough knowledge of the firm’s operations and an ability to identify 
areas of improvement has clear benefits.  
OLS regression is not suitable for testing this type of contingent effect. More specifically, 
linking the effect of CEO tenure to the firm’s growth rate would involve including the 
dependent variable on the right-hand side of the equation, which would make it impossible to 
estimate. To overcome this problem, we use quantile regression. By estimating the relation at 
a range of points of the conditional growth rates distribution, quantile regression is able to 
reveal the differing effect of CEO tenure in high-growth and in low-growth firms.  
Consistent with our hypothesis, we find that at higher quantiles (i.e. for high-growth firms) 
the effect of CEO tenure is significantly negative, while at lower quantiles (i.e. for low-
growth firms) the effect is significantly positive. The results hold using sales growth, asset 
growth and capital expenditures as proxies for firm growth. We argue that reverse causality is 
unlikely to be the reason for these results.  
 
 
2. Data and methodology 
2.1. Data  
Our analysis is performed using a large sample of Australian firms listed on the Australian 
Stock Exchange (ASX) over the period from 2001 to 2011. The financial data are from 
Aspect Huntley’s Fin-Analysis, which is the main source of information regarding Australian 
firms. Nonfinancial information, including CEO tenure, is sourced from SIRCA’s corporate 
governance database. Industry affiliation is based on CRIF codes. Consistent with previous 
studies, we exclude utilities and financial firms and drop observations with any missing data. 
The final sample consists of 2,545 firm-year observations representing 508 distinct firms that, 
on average, remain in the sample for slightly more than 5 years.  
2.2. Methodology  
In line with Lee (2014) and others, firm growth is measured by the percentage change in sales 
over the previous year. As alternative measures, we use assets growth and capital 
expenditures. Asset growth is also measured by the percentage growth in total assets, while 
the flow of capital expenditures is scaled by sales. CEO tenure, the key explanatory variable, 
is the number of years the CEO has held that position in the firm.  
To isolate the effect of CEO tenure, the regression model includes four firm characteristics 
that have been demonstrated to influence firm growth: firm size, firm age, growth 
opportunities and financial leverage.  
Research suggests that firm age is the most important factor affecting firm growth (Evans, 
1987; Dunne and Hughes, 1994; Becchetti and Trovato, 2002). Barba Navaretti et al. (2014) 
show that the negative effect of age is particularly significant among high-growth firms. As 
they grow older, firms exhaust their ability to find new markets and sustain high-growth rates. 
In particular, their investments in R&D tend to generate less growth (Coad et al., 2016).  
The effect of firm size on growth appears to be more disputed. The resource-based approach 
predicts that since they have access to more resources, large firms are more likely to achieve 
higher growth rates. In line with this view, a few studies report a positive relation between 
firm size and growth. However, the vast majority find a negative relation (Evans, 1987; 
Dunne and Hughes, 1994; Barba Navaretti et al., 2014; Coad et al, 2016).  
Another critical variable is the extent of the firm’s growth opportunities. Firms with more 
growth options are expected to grow faster. In contrast, leverage is expected to restrain firm 
growth since highly-levered firms are likely to run into greater difficulty in funding their 
investments (Lang et al., 1996; Becchetti and Trovato, 2002). 
In addition to the above firm characteristics, we include three board-related variables: board 
size, board independence and duality. Since these variables affect board decision processes 
(Judge and Zeithaml, 1992; Coles et al., 2008), they are likely to influence the firm’s 
operating efficiency and innovation capacity, and therefore its growth rate. Their inclusion 
helps to avoid attributing the influence of board characteristics to CEO tenure.  
CEO age is also included to distinguish the physiological effects of aging from the 
psychological effects induced by a longer tenure. Finally, a set of industry and year dummies 
complete the regression model. 
Firm growth = CEO tenure+ Firm age+ Firm size+ Growth opportunities+ Leverage+ Board size+ Board independence + Duality+ CEO age+ ′Year+ �′Industry+ � 
 
 
Table 1: Sample statistics 
Sales growth (asset growth) is the percentage change in sales (total assets) over the previous year. Capex is 
capital expenditures. CEO tenure is the number of years the CEO has been holding that position. Board size is 
the number of directors. Board independence is the fraction of independent directors on the board. Duality is a 
dummy indicating that the CEO is also the chairman of the board. Firm size is measured by the natural log of 
total assets. Firm age is the number of years the firm has been listed. Tobin’s Q is the proxy for growth 
opportunities. Leverage is debt over total assets. 
 
Mean  St-Dev. Q25 Q50 Q75 
Sales growth 0.2534 0.8633 -0.0625 0.0947 0.3859 
Asset growth 0.1473 0.5836 -0.0509 0.0758 0.2803 
Capex/ sales 0.0213 0.0254 0.0123 0.0271 0.0366 
CEO tenure 3.1683 2.1787 1 3 4 
CEO age 51.811 7.553 46 52 57 
Board size 5.7729 2.1351 4 5 7 
Board independence  0.5701 0.1687 0.5 0.6 0.7 
Duality  0.1116 0.3149 0 0 0 
Firm size 18.743 2.2801 17.175 18.678 20.377 
Firm age 15.303 12.502 6 12 20 
Tobin’s Q (log) 0.4995 0.7016 0.0456 0.3823 0.8624 
Leverage 0.1511 0.1541 0.0008 0.1103 0.2618 
 
The model is estimated using both OLS and quantile regressions. As indicated earlier, 
quantile regression is able to reveal heterogeneity in the relation between firm growth and 
CEO tenure by evaluating the effect of the independent variables at different quantiles of the 
conditional growth rates distribution (Johnston and DiNardo, 1997; Koenker, 2005). In 
contrast, OLS regression estimates the average effect for the average firm, and thus ignores 
any heterogeneity in the relationship. Coad and Rao (2008) use quantile regressions to 
uncover that investments in innovation are critical to the growth of high-growth firms, but not 
for other firms; while OLS estimates suggest the absence of any innovation effect. In line with 











quantiles of firm growth.  
3. Results and discussion 
3.1 Sample description 
The descriptive statistics for the sample are presented in Table 1. CEO tenure is on average 
3.4 years, which is one of the shortest in the world. In this respect, the Australian Business 
Review recently observed that “Aussie chiefs find it tough and brief at the top”. CEO age is 
about 51.8 years on average. A quarter of CEOs is younger than 46 while another quarter is 
older than 57. In line with ASX recommendations, a large majority of firms have separate 
leadership structures and a majority of independent directors. More precisely, CEO duality is 
observed in less than 11% of all firms, while only 30% of boards are not filled with a majority 
of independent directors.  
Table 2 provides the correlation between the variables. While understandably correlated, the 
three growth proxies appear to behave distinctively with their pairwise correlation reaching at 
most 26.4%. CEO tenure displays a weakly negative correlation with all the growth proxies. 
Some firm characteristics appear to be strongly associated with firm growth. For instance, 
large and highly-levered firms tend to have a typically lower growth profile. In contrast, firms 







Table 2: Correlation matrix 
All the variables are defined in Table 1. 
   [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] 
 
 
     
 
      
Sales growth [1] 1 
    
 
      
Asset growth [2] 0.2639 1 
   
 
      
Capex/ sales [3] 0.1459 0.2125 1 
  
 
      
CEO tenure [4] -0.0401 -0.0211 -0.0185 1 
 
 
      
CEO age [5] -0.0624 -0.0731 -0.0337 0.2331 1  
      
Board size [6] -0.1552 -0.0813 -0.1938 0.0455 0.1345 1 
      
Board indep.  [7] -0.1152 -0.0693 -0.0959 0.0648 0.0921 0.4344 1 
     
Duality  [8] 0.0359 -0.0317 0.0370 0.0498 0.1500 -0.1722 0.1292 1 
    
Firm size [9] -0.1585 0.1087 -0.1973 0.1737 0.1836 0.6910 0.3920 -0.2039 1 
   
Firm age [10] -0.0525 -0.0674 -0.0393 0.1433 0.1634 0.1660 0.1575 0.0056 0.2262 1 
  
Tobin’s Q [11] 0.1616 0.2942 0.2196 0.0134 -0.0275 -0.1008 -0.0387 0.0443 -0.1718 -0.0552 1 
 
Leverage [12] -0.1275 -0.1189 -0.2535 0.1163 0.0831 0.2515 0.2066 -0.0543 0.3737 0.1023 -0.1694 1 
 
 
Firm size is often strongly correlated with other firm characteristics. More specifically, large 
firms tend to have older, longer-serving CEOs. They are also less likely to appoint the CEO as 
chairman of the board. Given their greater complexity and need for advice, larger firms tend to 
have larger boards with a higher proportion of independent directors (Coles et al., 2008). These 
two board characteristics exhibit a strong positive correlation with each other. Likewise, CEO age 
and tenure are positively correlated. 
3.2 Effect of CEO tenure on sales growth 
Table 3 presents the results of quantile and OLS regressions of sales growth on CEO tenure. The 
results show that the effect of CEO tenure varies with the quantile at which it is estimated. In the 
lower quantiles, CEO tenure appears to have a significantly positive influence on sales growth. 
At the 10
th
 quantile, for instance, the increase in sales growth associated with an additional year 
in CEO tenure is 1.9%. The effect of CEO tenure decreases and becomes significantly negative as 
we move towards the higher quantiles. At the 90
th
 quantile, the difference in sales growth 
associated with an additional year in CEO tenure is -4.5%. These opposite effects tend to offset 
each other and explain the negligible effect obtained in the OLS regression.  
These findings support the hypothesis that the effect of CEO tenure is conditional on the firm’s 
growth rate. The strong negative effect of CEO tenure in high-growth firms suggests that the 
detrimental effect of a longer-serving CEO is more costly in high-growth firms because of the 
critical importance in those firms of being able to quickly switch to new paradigms (Miller, 
1991). Meanwhile, accumulated experience appears to be less beneficial given the unrelenting 
changes brought by high growth rates. In contrast, the positive effect of CEO tenure in firms 
characterized by low growth rates may be the result of a greater opportunity for CEOs to deploy 
their experience in a steadier environment (Henderson et al., 2006).  
Firm size appears to have the same contrasting effect on growth. The impact is positive at the 
lower end of the growth spectrum, but negative at the higher end. A possible explanation is the 
existence of diseconomies of scale in high-growth firms as they increase in size. In contrast, low-
growth firms may benefit from a bigger size to buy out smaller competitors and boost their sales. 
Leverage displays a similar effect. At the lower end of the growth spectrum, leverage can help to 
prevent a wasteful use of internal cash flows (Jensen, 1986). Hence, a better use of the firm’s 
resources that supports its growth. But in high-growth firms, leverage may discourage risk-taking 
and thus slow down growth.  
Four variables are seen to have a rather negative effect on sales growth: CEO age, firm age, board 
size, and board independence. To explain the negative influence of CEO age, Child (1974) 
underlines that younger managers can exert greater physical and mental effort, thus promoting 
change and growth in their companies. Regarding the influence of firm age, a common argument 
is that older firms tend to be less innovative (Coad et al., 2016). Using an argument grounded in 
group decision-making, Cheng (2008) infers that firms with larger boards are more conservative.  
In the case of board independence, the main idea is that it is used to achieve greater monitoring 
which may constrain the firm’s ability to grow. As expected, sales growth is significantly related 
to the presence of growth opportunities. In addition, the strength of the relationship is particularly 




Table 3: Regression of sales growth on CEO tenure 
All the variables are defined in Table 1. Year and industry dummies are included but nor reported. ***, **, * indicate 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level. 
      Quantile of sales growth 










    
CEO tenure -0.0188 0.0190 *** 0.0079 * -0.0015 -0.0105 ** -0.0450 ** 
(-1.12) (3.12) (1.80) (-0.63) (-2.06) (-2.15) 
CEO age -0.0131 ** -0.0024 -0.0026 ** -0.0024 *** -0.0066 ** -0.0151 * 
(-2.31) (-1.27) (-2.12) (-2.88) (-2.35) (-1.74) 
Board size  -0.0451 -0.0225 *** -0.0189 *** -0.0132 *** -0.0113 0.0191 
(-1.23) (-2.91) (-4.65) (-2.97) (-1.06) (0.62) 
Board indep. -0.6964 -0.0960 -0.0021 -0.0896 -0.2751 -1.2149 ** 
(-1.68) (-0.99) (-0.03) (-1.20) (-1.63) (-2.51) 
Duality 0.1640 -0.0011 -0.0339 -0.0071 0.1626 0.5863 
(1.22) (-0.02) (-0.73) (-0.18) (1.36) (0.94) 
Firm size  -0.0639 0.0902 *** 0.0539 *** 0.0114 -0.0309 ** -0.1561 ** 
(-1.42) (7.92) (5.20) (1.62) (-2.32) (-2.55) 
Firm age -0.0061 * -0.0032 *** -0.0012 ** -0.0014 *** -0.0022 * -0.0047 
(-1.84) (-2.67) (-2.34) (-3.20) (-1.67) (-1.60) 
Tobin’s Q  0.4350 *** -0.0040 0.0369 0.1038 *** 0.2437 *** 0.5905 *** 
(3.00) (-0.13) (1.64) (5.03) (4.04) (2.62) 
Leverage  -0.4321 0.1491 * -0.0135 0.0031 -0.1514 -0.8528 ** 
(-1.24) (1.80) (-0.18) (0.06) (-0.80) (-2.21) 
R
2
 / Pseudo R
2
 0.1010 0.1110 0.0303 0.0138 0.0534 0.2227 
 
3.3 Robustness checks 
We validate the conditional effect of CEO tenure on growth by using two alternative proxies: 
asset growth and capital expenditures to sales. The results, unreported but available upon request, 
support the claim that the effect of CEO tenure depends on the quantile at which the model is 
estimated. In the lower quantiles, the effect is significantly positive, while in the higher quantiles, 
the effect is significantly negative.  
Using the percentage change in total assets, the impact on growth is about -1% at the 10
th
 quantile 
and +2.5% at the 90
th
 quantile. The effect of the other variables appears to be more consistent 
across quantiles. CEO age, firm age, leverage, board size and board independence are associated 
with a significant negative effect. In contrast, firm size and Tobin’s Q appear to have a significant 
positive effect. This greater consistency is reflected in OLS estimates that are more significant.  
With growth measured by capital expenditures to sales, model fit is less good. The variables that 
retain their significance are: firm size, firm age and leverage, with a negative sign, and growth 
opportunities, with a positive sign. Most importantly, the effect of CEO tenure is positive in the 
lower growth quantiles and negative in the higher growth quantiles. Hence, the results 
substantiate the idea that CEO tenure can be both beneficial and detrimental to firm growth; and 
that the effect depends on the firm’s growth rate. 
 
 
One potential concern is that the effect on firm growth is not due to the CEO’s tenure, but rather 
caused by the firm’s behavior. In fact, one may observe the same results if firms with very high 
growth rates change their CEOs more frequently (and similarly for firms with very low growth 
rates). To dismiss this argument, we analyze the effect of firm growth on the likelihood of CEO 
turnover. To account for the distinct effect depending on the firm’s growth rate, the coefficient on 
firm growth is allowed to take different values on either side of the median. The control variables 
include firm size, leverage, Tobin’s Q, board size, independence, duality, CEO age and tenure, 
and industry and year dummies.  
The logit regression, which we do not report to save space, indicates that the likelihood of CEO 
turnover decreases as firm growth increases in the right side of the distribution, but is unaffected 
by firm growth in the left side of the distribution. Hence, reverse causality does not appear to be 
the explanation for the conditional relation between CEO tenure and firm growth. Consistent with 
Brickley (2003), we also find that CEO age and tenure are associated with a higher probability of 
a CEO change. On the other hand, duality appears to entrench CEOs and make them less 
susceptible to be removed.  
4. Conclusion 
Firm growth is a critical issue for investors and policymakers alike. Researchers have long striven 
to identify the drivers of corporate growth around the world, focusing essentially on the role of 
innovation. This study is the first to underline the role of CEO tenure. 
Using a large sample of Australian firms over the period 2001 to 2011, we show that sales 
growth, asset growth and capital expenditures to sales are all related to the length of CEO tenure. 
More importantly, the relation is shown to be conditional on the firm’s growth. In high-growth 
firms, CEO tenure appears to have a negative effect on growth. This result may be due to the 
lower ability of CEOs to embrace new paradigms the longer they have been on the job (Miller, 
1991). In low-growth firms, CEO tenure appears, on the other hand, to be associated with a 
positive effect on growth. The explanation may be that long-tenured CEOs make the most of their 
experience in a stable environment.  
These conditional effects are concealed from standard OLS analysis, which provides the average 
effect on the average firm. In comparison, quantile regression is able to reveal the heterogeneous 
effect of CEO tenure by examining the effect at different quantiles of the conditional growth 
distribution. Contrary to the negligible effect suggested by the OLS estimates, CEO tenure can 
have a significant impact on growth. Firms would be well-advised to change their CEOs more 
often if they are rapidly growing; but can keep their CEOs longer if their business is growing at a 
slower pace.  
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